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I Are TNCs Beginning to Act
Responsibly?
The growth of TNCs acting, (or appearing to act),
in an environmentally and socially responsible way
has variously been labelled 'corporate environmen-
talism' by supporters, and 'greenwash' by sceptics
(see Bebe, this volume). An increase in environ-
mental awareness helps to explain the phenomena,
as do two other significant factors.
(i) Concern over the increasing power of TNCs
Concern has risen over the increasingly unregu-
lated power of TNCs. The sheer size of TNCs gives
them enormous financial muscle without the con-
straint of democratic channels of accountability
(Korten 1995). It has been estimated that in 1988
there were 20,000 TNCs with total assets worth
over $4 trillion (Dunning 1993: 14) and that they
now control up to 70 per cent of world trade
(World Bank figures quoted in Lang and Hines
1993: 34). In the early 1990s there were only 60
countries with GNPs in excess of $10 billion,
whereas there were more than twice that number of
TNCs with annual sales greater than $10 billion
(Sklair 1994: 166-7).
It is not just the number and size of TNCs that has
raised concerns however, but also their global
reach. The global ascendancy of neo-liberal ideol-
ogy has facilitated economic globalisation via mar-
ket deregulation and promoted by institutions such
as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the
attempted Multilateral Agreement on Investment
(MAI). Not only has economic globalisation been
given the fillip of such structures, but also the
demise of institutions monitoring and regulating
TNCs, such as the United Nations Centre on
Transnational Corporations, has been significant
(Greer and Bruno 1996: 23). Corporate lobby
groups were also successful in removing examina-
tion of the environmental impact of TNCs from the
UNCED process in Rio (Chatterjee and Finger
1994; Hildyard 1993: 28-9).
It is therefore claimed that TNCs are frequently more
powerful than the states in which they operate
(Waters 1995: 33). 'Given the increasing economic
As QIT, the company proposing the mining venture, is
a wholly owned subsidiary of Rio Tinto, the parent
company is generally refered to throughout this article.
power of these corporations and their ability to slip
between the network of the sovereignty of individual
states, there will continue to be concerns about their
activities' (Luard 1990: 151). The case study pre-
sented in this article is an attempt to examine how
some of these concerns play out in Madagascar.
(ii) The increasing role of NGOs
Where NGOs have been established to monitor
TNCs they have traditionally been associated with
attempts to moderate their behaviour and impact. It
can be argued that the role of NGOs in this process
u more important now than it ever has been.
Globalisation has affected NGOs as much as it has
affected TNCs, expanding their number, size and
geographical coverage (Willetts 1998: 207, see also
Fabig and Boele, this volume). The growth of
international communications technology has facil-
itated international networking and alliances,
which increasingly transcend geographical bound-
aries, broadening the power and influence of NGOs
(Watts 1998: 24).
NGOs influence the activities of TNCs in three cru-
cial ways. First, through lobbying and encouraging
others to lobby, they have brought pressure to bear
on TNCs. Second, they have helped set and enforce
regulations and standards which, at the risk of finan-
cial loss, TNCs are keen to aspire to. For example
World Wide Fund (WWF) have worked with indus-
try to develop the Forest Stewardship Council,
which is designed to provide environmental
labelling for timber. The International Organisation
for Standardisation (ISO) has, at the same time,
broadened the scope of its certification, moving
from a concern over product standards to process,
management, environmental and now even social
standards (Finger, this volume). Third, NGOs have
helped generate consumer concern to the extent that
it ïs now in a company's long term competitive inter-
ests to act responsibly TNCs are increasingly
attempting to gain greater environmental kudos
than their competitors by having their activities
associated with good practice (Bebe, this volume).
In association with the two key processes indi-
cated above, the global and electronic media have
helped place environmental and social issues
firmly on the international political agenda. TNCs
are increasingly operating in a 'global goldfish
howl' (Watts 1998: 24) in which their operations
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in specific localities are being judged by a world-
wide audience. All of this has meant that TNCs
which operate internationally 'need more and
more to take account of opinions which are
formed internationally' (Mitchell 1998: 1). TNCs,
therefore, are exhibiting their green credentials
simultaneously to a broad audience internation-
ally, nationally, and locally
Businesses are starting to recognise they need to
respond to (or at least be seen to respond to) the
'triple bottom line' (Elkington 1998) of not only
meeting existing profit margins, but also environ-
mental and social concerns. One key aspect of this
ethical approach to business is the need to increas-
ingly involve and engage with indigenous people
when a company activities change local environ-
ments. Even with the increasing unregulated pow-
ers of TNCs noted above, this element is likely to
become ever more important as NGOs and other
pressure groups expand social norms of what is tol-
erable behaviour and help set higher moral stan-
dards for business practises.
For all of these reasons TNCs are now keen to pre-
sent themselves as socially and environmentally
aware to a variety of actors at the international level.
First, there are actual and potential investors,
including shareholders, shareholding institutions,
and multilateral and bilateral donor agencies.
Second, it is often valuable to have the support for
a project of inter-governmental bureaucratic struc-
tures such as agencies of the United Nations. Third,
NGOs with their ever-growing power within the
global political arena are targeted for their support.
Fourth, it is important for TNCs to present them-
selves and their products favourably to consumers.
The last main actor at the international level is the
media. In recent years high level bursts of negative
media coverage have necessitated diversions from
the pursuit of short-term profit by several TNCs
(Gray 1998: 75), a situation most would rather
avoid. These factors have combined to engage
TNCs with other interested actors in complex inter-
actions, both directly and indirectly, across the
global political system.
In addition to this, at the national level, TNCs must
also gain the acceptance of states in the form of
governments, politicians, civil servants and advi-
sors. While most states are keen to demand high
environmental and social standards within their
borders, at least rhetorically, the reality of escalat-
ing debts can make the imperative of attracting
investment greater than that of stipulating (or
enforcing) social and environmental regulations.
At the local level too, many similar actors must be
reached, such as local government, NGOs, and the
media, as the increasingly interconnected nature of
global systems allows the rapid transfer of local
issues to national and international arenas, and vice
versa. The key area for TNCs now is to engage with,
involve and gain the consent of local people affected
by their activities. Previously it was possible for
TNCs to focus more on gaining state agreements
and attracting international finance than on work-
ing with local people. Now, however, the climate is
changing and TNCs are finding it ever more impor-
tant to be seen to be working with the local com-
munities where they operate. They can no longer
ignore local values and impose changes upon com-
munities (Willetts 1998e 225).
2 The Case Study - Rio Tinto in
Madagascar
Much of the material in this article is drawn from
fieldwork conducted during 1997-8 in and around
the village of Evatra, which is at the centre of a pro-
posed mining site2 by Rio Tinto. Examination of Rio
Tintos current mining venture is informative as it
offers a contemporary opportunity to try and dis-
tinguish where the boundaries between ethical real-
ity and rhetoric lie. It enables an assessment to be
made of the company's attempts to gain legitimisa-
tion and provides the opportunity to suggest areas
that need more attention.
Rio Tinto's environmental and social record has
received much criticism in the past (Friends of the
Earth 1995; Moody 1990 and 1996; PARTiZANS3
quarterly). As the biggest and most global mining
company in the world, Rio Tinto are regularly
engaged in controversial projects. Past criticism
when working in environmentally sensitive areas
and lands occupied by indigenous peoples has led
the company to adopt a new strategy for its
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Madagascar project. Whereas TNCs in the past have
been associated with attempts at lowering stan-
dards, here the company is voluntarily seeking to
set its own standards of environmental and social
responsibility at a very high level. Acknowledging
that business will only lead the way in such ethical
standard setting as far as profit margins allow, the
question here is how reconcilable are concerns
about the environment and social development,
utilitarian interests in maintaining long-run busi-
ness viability, and attaining more immediate public
relations goals.
Madagascar is one of the world's poorest countries,
with an external debt of approximately $4,175
(Economist Intelligence Unit 1998: 20). The pro-
posed project, to mine titanium dioxide (mainly to
be used as an industrial whitener), would require
investment of $400 million over 40 years. There are
clear benefits from the project, particularly: regional
economic development, infrastructural improve-
ments (such as a new port, road building, electrifi-
cation and water supply), employment, and
associated social development initiatives. However,
there are also a number of potential drawbacks.
Setting aside the finite nature of mineral extraction
which makes it an inherently unsustainable activity,
there are also questions as to the extent to which
existing local economic activities will be under-
mined and whether the economic multiplier of the
project will be as great as these activities (particu-
larly tourism and seafood operations) There will be
significant changes to land use in and around the
project area, most notably for the resident villagers
who currently utilise may natural resources in the
vicinity. Sacred lands, including cemeteries (which
are highly significant within the context of Malagasy
ancestral veneration) are likely to be affected by the
venture, as is the region's biodiversity, elements of
which are endemic. Although Rio Tinto has entered
a partnership arrangement with the Malagasy gov-
ernment, questions remain to be answered about
the extent of local involvement and consent.
There are three main elements to Rio Tinto's current
strategy of legitimation in relation to the project.
First, rather than waiting to respond to criticism
2 For further details of the village and elaboration of the PARTÎZANS is People Against Rio Tinto Zinc And
type of research methods employed see the forthcoming Subsidiaries.
article dealing with tourism and land rights (Mulligan
1999).
about the project, Rio Tinto have from an early
stage publicly acknowledged the environmental
and social problems that mining in the area is likely
to cause. Along with this they have accepted that
responsibility for dealing with these problems, to a
large extent, lies with them and as such they are try-
ing to find appropriate solutions. A number of
social and environmental satellite projects have
been proposed to mitigate the negative impacts of
the mining. Instead of operating in a secretive or
even hostile manner, they are currently pursuing a
strategy of engagement and open dialogue with var-
tous stakeholders and potential opponents.
Whereas in 1981 one RTZ (now Rio Tinto)
director said he would 'crush Survival
International like a fly' if the tribal peoples' sup-
port organisation did not call off its campaign
against the Cerro Colorado mine in Panama,
today the company invites its detractors to
lunch. When Friends of the Earth in 1995 vehe-
mently condemned RTZ's plan to exploit min-
eral sands in rainforests in south-east
Madagascar, the environmental organisation was
invited by company chairman Derek Birkin 'to
be part of the process of appraising our plans, at
some stage in the future' (Moody 1996: 50).
Second, great effort and expense has been incurred
in recruiting various 'experts' to work on the pro-
ject. The roll-call of renowned academics and
recognised specialists involved with the extensive
Environmental Impact Assessment and current
social study (involving a public consultation exer-
cise) is impressive, and helps explain how the com-
pany have so far spent over $30 million on the
project's development. A research station has been
set up which is at the cutting edge of understand-
ings about the region's complex biodiversity And
while the company has carefully recruited appro-
priate personnel, it still recognises the need to bring
in outside expertise as and when necessary such as
environmental and social scientists.
the third element of the legitimisation process has
been to work in partnership with the government.
Although the company has strategic interests in gain-
thg state support,4 by working with the government
Rio Tinto are demonstrating their broader commit-
ment to the country An operating company has been
established to run the project, in which the govern-
ment holds a 20 per cent share. Rio Tinto are also
encouraging government efforts to implement a
regional development plan for the southeast of the
country where the mining project would take place.
The company is keen to emphasise that the ultimate
decision as to whether the project can go ahead or
not rests with the government and not them, They
also stress the independence and high standards of
various governmental organisations with responsibil-
ity to vet the progress of the proposed project.
2.1 Positive aspects of the legitimising
process
As well as a number of undoubted benefits the
mine would bring to the region, there are several
positive aspects of the company's conduct.
Fundamentally, it is commendable that Rio Tinto is
attempting to act in a responsible way, which is bet-
ter than a lack of corporate responsibility Its
acknowledgement of certain problems associated
with the project means that at least attempts are
being made to minimise the negative impacts of
such development on the environment and local
people. The company is already engaged in a num-
ber of social development projects and has plans
for more should the project commence. Through
these initiatives, the sustainability of local liveli-
hood systems is being encouraged and there is
recognition by the company that the needs of the
poorest must be addressed.
Likewise, the company is committed to the use of
what they believe are appropriate methods and best
practise in generating research concerning the pro-
ject. They are not rushing into the region and are
careful not to irresponsibly raise expectations. They
have spent over ten years so far producing baseline
data and conducting surveys and feasibility studies.
As well as bringing in outside experts where neces-
sary, the company is committed to employing local
people at all levels. It is also encouraging to witness
the company operating in a more transparent man-
ner, with the research material they have commis-
sioned becoming available within the public domain.
For example, it was necessary to create new legislation infrastructure for the project to remain financially
allowing the project to proceed, and the company feasible.
requires substantial government spending on regional
2.2 Areas of concern with Rio Tinto's
attempts at legitimisation
Anxieties about the project can be divided into
three categories.
(j) Greenwash
When a company with an ethical record like Rio
Tintos seems to have undergone such a turnaround,
it is tempting to question its motivation. However,
the problematic nature of this exercise should be
noted, as it is difficult to prove motivation and dif-
ferent branches or departments within the company
may hold multiple, or even contradictory motives
simultaneously It is also worth noting that for the
local people affected by the project, the question of
motivation is not necessarily an important one.
Actions offer some indication of the company's
intentions however, and although Rio Tinto appear
to have spent a considerable sum on laudable
undertakings, $30 million over the last 12 years is
negligible compared to annual sales, which in 1997
alone were $7.7 billion (The Industry Standard
1999).
Taking a broader picture, it is useful to judge TNCs
not only by the efforts they are making on the pro-
jects they themselves put forward as examples of
best practice, but also to look at a wider spectrum
of their activities, The 'greening' of one project may,
intentionally or otherwise, divert attention from
other less acceptable practices. In the case of Rio
Tinto, open cast mining continues in Irian Jaya,
where local people have not been consulted or
compensated and sacred sites have been destroyed
(World Development Movement 1999); uranium
mining proceeds at Kintyre in Australia; and in
Bougainville mining has destroyed the environ-
ment while indigenous rights have been ignored
(Rowell 1996: 275). Taking a wider company per-
spective allows a more balanced assessment as to
whether a project like the one in Madagascar is a
'flagship', setting standards for other business ven-
tures to meet, or if it is a 'smokescreen' behind
which less acceptable activities hide, If these less
acceptable activities exist they can seriously under-
mine the credibility of positive efforts being made
elsewhere.
The majority of the villagers studied had never
travelled far and had limited understanding of a broader
geopolitical context. Some were illiterate (including
having difficulty in recognising simple pictures) and
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One indication of the extent to which the enlïght-
ened thinking of the subsidiary operating in
Madagascar has permeated the rest of the company,
will be whether it sets up structures to transplant
what they learn in Madagascar to their existing and
forthcoming projects elsewhere.
(ii) Participation
Two factors are significant here. The first concerns
the meaningfulness of the participation that Rio
Tinto are promulgating. Local villagers (in almost
every case) are ill-informed about most aspects of
the mining venture, to such an extent as to question
how meaningful participation with the mining
company has been. Not only this, but the limited
worldview that most of the villagers have draws
into question the worth of the current consultation
exercise. While this exercise may be comprehen-
sive, extensive, and even expensive, if it fails to
recognise that most villagers would have difficulty
in comprehending the scale of the project or the
extent and ways in which their lives are likely to be
altered, it is also of limited value in terms of mean-
ingful participation. For local consent of the project
to be truly legitimate, it must be gained from peo-
ple with full understanding of what they are con-
senting too. This is necessary to avoid claims of
'teleguided' participation where people 'do not feel
they are being forced into doing something, but are
actually being led to take actions which are inspired
or directed by centres outside their control'
(Rahnema 1996: 116). However, the difficulty for
all external actors (not just the mining company) in
trying to gain meaningful consent and understand-
ïng of that which is outside the worldview of the vil-
lagers should be recognised.
The second factor, in relation to participation, con-
cerns land rights. The company does not recognise
customary local land rights, but instead upholds the
government's assertion that all land without legal
title belongs to the state. It is hardly surprising that
virtually no villagers are in possession of legal title
to the land they use or that villages do not collec-
tively hold legal title to their traditional commons.
In not recognising local ownership of ancestral
lands, the mining company do not have to give the
many were unclear about the concept of a 'country' and
knew almost nothing of lïfe outside the region, let alone
Madagascar.
participation of local people as much importance as
they would to the 'owners' of the land.
(iii) Subtle corporate strategy
The remaining concerns are over more subtle mech-
anisms and techniques that are being utilised by the
company in their attempt to gain legitimacy for
their actions. First, through use of and reference to
experts' and 'expert knowledge' the company is
able to claim an intellectual monopoly over debates
concerning the project. The company, by establish-
ing certain forms of knowledge as valid, is able to
marginalise in the debate those groups incapable of
participating in these forms of discourse.
Second, by emphasising the abundant nature of
processed titanium dioxide in everyday products that
most people (in the North) use (such as toothpaste,
paper, plastic, paint, etc.), the company implicates
consumers as being complicit in the environmental
and social externalities of production. Attributing
blame to consumers in this case is somewhat unfair,
however, as people generally do not know that they
are using the product and are not given a choice of
alternatives. They are also unaware of the social and
environmental costs associated with its production.
Third, company research has called into question
the current sustainability of local livelihoods, as
population growth impacts on already increasing
rates of forest destruction. While this may well be
an accurate interpretation of natural resource use,
constructing local livelihoods as unsustainable
helps justify the case for the mine as an economíc
alternative for the region. What is problematic here
is that these claims of local unsustainability origi-
nate from some of the most unsustainable societies
in the world. Not only that, but they are being made
by a company that has historically derived most of
its money in environmentally unsustainable ways.
Finally, one should be aware of the dominance Rio
Tinto have in setting the agenda of the proposed
project and governing its operation. There is a dan-
ger that the company, which is the main force
behind the project, will also become its imple-
menter and assessor. The whole process of environ-
nental and social impact studies is designed to
co-opt people into a process of approval. Outcomes
are validated by a process whose terms are set by
the company 1f the process were not being driven
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by the company, then instead of the current focus
on how the project might best be carried out, there
might be more attention paid as to whether the pro-
ject should be implemented at all. With such a shift
in emphasis a more community-centred approach
to development in the region would be achieved.
In a world where states are less willing or able to act
in the regulation of TN Cs, new forms of governance
are expected by TNCs in conjunction with environ-
mental NGOs (Newell 1999). This leaves the ques-
tion of who governs the governors as yet
unanswered and can inevitably lead to local con-
flicts of interest when TNCs act as states within
states or as de facto states.
3 Policy Implications
A number of policy implications stem from the case
study presented here, which, while specific to the
example in question, are broadly transferable to
other similar situations.
In order to gain meaningful consent, the pro-
ject's pros and cons should be presented to the
local people in a way that is comprehensible to
them. This may require some education as to
what the project actually involves, what alterna-
tives exist and how existing economic practices
will be affected.
There should be independent auditing and
monitoring, with input from those affected by
the project, throughout the different stages of
the venture. In order to maintain the credibility
of the project and those involved with it, it
should be made clear that when experts are
consulted it is for knowledge and advice rather
than validation. Giving consultants editorial
freedom and allowing them to retain copyright
of material produced could help facilitate this.
One possible strategy to help maintain the inde-
pendence of monitors, advisors and researchers
would be to pay for them from a 'blind fund' of
monies given to a holding body possibly in
conjunction with other companies that have
similar interests. Alternatively 'blind funds'
could be established with particular institu-
tions, rather than companies funding specific
people at institutions to carry out individual
pieces of research.
There should be some recognition of collective
indigenous land rights by the company, as
expounded in the draft Declaration of the
United Nations Working Group on Indigenous
Peoples (United Nations 1992). These land
rights should include the rights to subsurface
mineral deposits (see Donigi (1994) on the legal
case for this). This recognition could be in the
form of a lease or profit share arrangement with
the village, giving the villagers a stake in the
mining project. It should be clearly stated and
agreed by all sides what the project entails and
what the villagers can expect. A limited 'get-out'
clause if the villagers became unhappy with the
project would act as an incentive for the mining
company to act responsïbly. 'Strict civil liability
agreements' may serve this purpose (Greer and
Bruno 1996: 254-6). These agreements would
have to be sensitive to where the villagers' inter-
ests fit into the wider economic needs of the
region. This would avoid the risk of one village
being able to hold up unreasonably the eco-
nomic development of the whole region.
One of the ideological successes of TNCs is the
way in which they blur the distinction between
their own and national interests (Lang and
Hines 1993: 33). In this light the power of Rio
Tinto to influence the formation of the regional
development plan in their favour must be
recognised; 'RTZ, its subsidiaries and its part-
ners maintain an extraordinary capacity to
influence domestic power brokers in the
regions where they operate' (Moody 1996: 48).
The independence of the regional plan must be
maintained, including the proposal and fair
consideration of alternatives to the mining pro-
ject. The lower levels of financial and cultural
capital that proponents of alternative develop-
ment plans may have should be recognised and
taken into consideration. Any plan for the
region must include the long-term interests of
the area, recognising the finite nature of the
mineral deposits. Strategies to deal with
changes to the region that are likely to result
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from the establishment of the project and the
subsequent ending of the project should be put
in place.
Finally it should be noted that while none of the
above policy recommendations would necessarily
guarantee socially beneficial or environmentally
responsible practice, they would help allow for the
possibility of it.
4 Conclusions
Before judgement can fully be made about the pro-
ject a number of factors should be born in mind.
These include the potential economic value of the
project to the region and local community, a sense
of what it is reasonable to expect of companies, and
the repercussions of non-investment by this or any
other mining company It has to be remembered
that TNCs are profit-seeking organisations and can-
not be expected to adopt the same concerns as
NGOs or the people affected by their development
projects.
In terms of this particular case it remains to be seen
how meaningful the current process of dialogue is.
There is a strong case for independent assessment
during and after the project to help establish that
this is taking place. This is because the impotence
of the state and its weak financial position call into
question its ability to be able to do this effectively
and the capacity of TNCs to regulate themselves
has yet to be established. There are some funda-
mental problems with Rio Tintos current efforts to
gain legitimacy, particularly over the issue of not
recognising forms of indigenous land ownership
and problems with the meaningfulness of villager
participation and consent. Nevertheless, what is
clear is that companies are increasingly subject to
new pressures. This article has sought to examine
how Rio Tinto have responded in the context of
one project in one country. The challenge, in a
wider context, is to develop best practice models of
NGOTNC engagement centred on the needs of
affected communities.
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